The Ontological Argument

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines ontological as “relating to or based upon being or existence”. The “ontological argument” therefore is an attempt at proving God’s existence through purely deductive reasoning not reliant on biblical revelation. 

The first ontological argument was proposed in 1078 AD by St. Anselm of Canterbury in his work, Proslogion.  

Famous apologist, Dr. William Lane Craig, summarizes this argument as shown^[1]:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists, therefore…
2. A maximally great being exists in some possible world, therefore…
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world (you can’t be maximally great if you only exist in some worlds), therefore…
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world, therefore…
5. A maximally great being exists in the actual world, therefore…
6. A maximally great being exists.

On its face, this seems to me to be an intuitively sound argument (we’ll get to more of this in just a bit), and it has received support by some of the brightest minds in philosophy: Norman Malcolm, Rene Descartes, and Alvin Plantinga. 

Of course, however, it is not without its detractors. The idea of a “maximally great being” jumps out at some as being an arbitrary title. In fact, it was the source of the argument’s first official criticism by a monk named Guanilo of Marmoutier, a contemporary of St. Anselm. 

Guanilo feared that one could use Anselm’s argument to “prove” the existence of a litany of non-existent things. Guanilo used the proof^[2] shown below to make his point:

1. It is a conceptual truth that a piland is an island than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible island that can be imagined).
2. A piland exists as an idea in the mind.
3. A piland that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a piland that exists only as an idea in the mind.
4. Thus, if a piland exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine an island that is greater than a piland (that is, a greatest possible island that does exist).
5. But we cannot imagine an island that is greater than a piland.
6. Therefore, a piland exists.

Of course, there is no “maximally great island” or “piland”. Based on Guanilo’s parody of the argument, Anselm’s proof appears to fall flat.

But is it really that weak of an argument?

The crux of the argument seems to rest on the definition of “maximally great”. For the sake of discussion, let’s accept the traditional view of a “maximally great being”:

1. All powerful
2. All knowing
3. Morally Perfect

These appear to be intuitively obvious intrinsic values of such a being if one were to exist. 

The same cannot be said for an island. 

Should the island be tropical or littered with snow-capped mountains? Would you like casinos on this island, or would you prefer it to be largely uninhabited? 

There are no intuitively obvious “maximally great” intrinsic values for an island any more than there are for a pizza or any other physical object.

Based on the obvious differences between physical objects and a divine being, it is Guanilo’s rebuttal that appears to fall flat, not St. Anselm’s argument.

Other Parodies of the Ontological Argument

Guanilo was not alone in his attempt to parody Anselm’s argument. In 1984, Raymond Smullyan^[3] proposed the following proof:

1. The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable.
2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator.
3. The greater the disability or handicap of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.
5. Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being—namely, one who created everything while not existing.
6. An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
7. (Hence) God does not exist

Unlike Anselm’s argument, Smullyan’s conclusion that a “maximally great being” would be one that does not exist and yet created the universe is logically incoherent. The idea of a “non-existent creator” is as nonsensical as a squared circle or a married bachelor. There is no possible world where this being could exist. The argument fails before it ever gets started.

Conclusion

I find Anselm’s ontological argument to be an intuitively sound, logically consistent argument for God’s existence. It clearly cannot be easily dismissed as Guanilo and Smullyan have attempted. 

It rises or falls with the first premise. 

Is it possible that a maximally great being exists? 

Even the most faithful atheist has to admit that it is at least possible that a maximally great God exists. If it is at least possible, then the rest of the proof logically follows. To refute the argument, the atheist must show that it is not possible for a “maximally great being” to exist. This would seem to be a tall, if not impossible, task.

Up Next

These first few blog posts have stuck to a strictly secular defense for God’s existence. Starting next week, I’ll begin to review a few of the more spiritually and historically significant reasons why I believe that a belief in the God of Calvary is well founded.

I am also planning to interject a few reviews for books that I have found to be edifying or interesting in their take on God’s existence.

Stay tuned.

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^[1] Craig, W. L. (2016, August 16). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBmAKCvWl74

^[2] Himma, K. E. (n.d.). Anselm: Ontological Argument for God’s Existence. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/

^[3] Oppy, G. (2019, February 6). Ontological Arguments. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/